Robust evidence and secure evidence claims

Philosophy of Science 71 (4):467-488 (2004)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have claimed that evidence for a theory is better when multiple independent tests yield the same result, i.e., when experimental results are robust. Little has been said about the grounds on which such a claim rests, however. The present essay presents an analysis of the evidential value of robustness that rests on the fallibility of assumptions about the reliability of testing procedures and a distinction between the strength of evidence and the security of an evidence claim. Robustness can enhance the security of an evidence claim either by providing what I call second-order evidence, or by providing back-up evidence for a hypothesis.

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Kent Staley
Saint Louis University

Citations of this work

Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw008.
Robustness, discordance, and relevance.Jacob Stegenga - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):650-661.
Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):971–984.
Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.

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References found in this work

Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (4):381-390.
The Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (13):362-364.
Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.
The Book of Evidence.Peter Achinstein - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

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