Wolpert, Chaitin y Wittgenstein sobre la imposibilidad, la incompletitud, la paradoja mentirosa, el teísmo, los límites de la computación, un principio de incertidumbre mecánica no cuántica y el universo como computadora, el teorema definitivo en la teoría de la máquina de Turing (revisado en 2019)

In Observaciones Sobre Imposibilidad, Incompleta, Paracoherencia,Indecisión,Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja E Incertidumbre En Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, Dacosta, Godel, Searle, Rodych, Berto,Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock Y Yanofsky. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 64-70 (2019)
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Abstract

It is commonly thought that Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason are disparate scientific physical or mathematical issues having little or nothing in common. I suggest that they are largely standard philosophical problems (i.e., language games) which were mostly resolved by Wittgenstein over 80years ago. “What we are ‘tempted to say’ in such a case is, of course, not philosophy, but it is its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.” Wittgenstein PI 234 "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." Wittgenstein I provide a brief summary of some of the major findings of two of the most eminent students of behavior of modern times, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything, but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I dissect some writings of a few of the major commentators on these issues from a Wittgensteinian viewpoint in the framework of the modern perspective of the two systems of thought (popularized as ‘thinking fast, thinking slow’), employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. I show that this is a powerful heuristic for describing the true nature of these putative scientific, physical or mathematical issues which are really best approached as standard philosophical problems of how language is to be used (language games in Wittgenstein’s terminology). It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic System 1 actions or reflexes.

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