Environmental Ethics 43 (4):339-354 (2021)

Espen Dyrnes Stabell
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
The value of nature has been extensively debated in environmental ethics. There has been less discussion, however, about how one should understand the relation between this value and normativity, or reasons: if something in nature is seen as valuable, how should we understand the relation between this fact and claims about reasons to, for example, protect it or promote its existence? The “commonsense” view is that value gives rise to reasons. The buck-passing account of value, on the other hand, implies that for an entity or state of affairs in nature to be valuable just is for it to have properties that provide reasons to promote or have a pro-attitude towards it. BPA has been extensively debated, but has received little attention in environmental philosophy. In this paper, it is argued that the view suggests a “reasons first” approach to environmental ethics, and that it should be preferred to competing accounts of value in the context of environmental ethics.
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Business and Professional Ethics  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  Social and Political Philosophy  Social Science
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DOI 10.5840/enviroethics202211434
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