In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 385--400 (2002)

Authors
Robert Stalnaker
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
This paper examines the disagreement between those who think zombies are possible and those who think they are not. It aims to shed light on general questions about the nature of modal claims, and about the relation between metaphysical, semantic, and empirical questions. The views of three functional philosophers who provide unequivocal answers to the question “Are zombies possible?” are described.
Keywords Metaphysics  Possibility  Zombie
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1093/0199251487.003.0014
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A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Illusions of Gunk.J. Robert G. Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513.
Real Acquaintance and Physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydney

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