Why There May Be Epistemic Duties

Dialogue 54 (1):63-89 (2015)
Scott Stapleford
St. Thomas University
Chase Wrenn argues that there are no epistemic duties. When it appears that we have an epistemic duty to believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement about some proposition P, we are really under a moral obligation to adopt the attitude towards P that our evidence favours. The argument appeals to theoretical parsimony: our conceptual scheme will be simpler without epistemic duties and we should therefore drop them. I argue that Wrenn’s strategy is flawed. There may well be things that we ought to do on epistemic grounds alone.
Keywords epistemic duty  ethics of belief  parsimony  Occam's Razor  epistemic deontology
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DOI 10.1017/S001221731400078X
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References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.

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From Epistemic to Moral Realism.Spencer Case - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.

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