Faith and Philosophy 6 (3):303-319 (1989)
A paradox is constructed employing four languages L1-L4, such that L1 is a metalanguage for L3, L3 for L2, and L2 for L1; L4 functions as the semantic meta-metalanguage for each of L1-L3. The paradox purports to show that no omniscient being can exist, given that there is a set of true sentences (each true within its respective language) from L1, L2, and L3 that no omniscient being can believe.The remainder of the paper consists in an examination of some attempts at challenging the paradox on syntactic, semantic and pragmatic grounds. Just which of these attempts are the most promising for the religious person is a question which is left open
|Keywords||Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy and Religion|
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