A Propositional Theory of Truth

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (4):503-545 (2018)
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The liar and kindred paradoxes show that we can derive contradictions if our language possesses sentences lending themselves to paradox and we reason classically from schema about truth: Sis true iffp, where the letter p is to be replaced with a sentence and the letter S with a name of that sentence. This article presents a theory of truth that keeps at the expense of classical logic. The theory is couched in a language that possesses paradoxical sentences. It incorporates all the instances of the analogue of for that language and also includes other platitudes about truth. The theory avoids contradiction because its logical framework is an appropriately constructed nonclassical propositional logic. The logic and the theory are different from others that have been proposed for keeping, and the methods used in the main proofs are novel.



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Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Truth without contra(di)ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.
On existentialism.Alvin Plantinga - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (1):1 - 20.
On the idea of a general proof theory.Dag Prawitz - 1974 - Synthese 27 (1-2):63 - 77.

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