The Monist 76 (1):66-80 (1993)

Agent-relativity, as an attribute of principles for moral decision, reasons for action, and values, has been a topic of discussion in recent ethical theory primarily in the context of objections to act-consequentialism. Thus, Samuel Scheffler explains that act-consequentialist theories “first specify some principle for ranking overall states of affairs from best to worst from an impersonal point of view.” These rankings are not agent-relative, i.e., “they do not vary from person to person, depending on what one’s particular situation is.” Scheffler notes that this is because “they do not embody judgements about which overall states of affairs are best for particular individuals, but rather judgements about which states of affairs are best, all things considered, from an impartial standpoint.” Act-consequentialism then directs each agent always to bring about the highest-ranked state of affairs that he or she can.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist19937613
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