Philosophy of Science 80 (5):818-828 (2013)

The argument from inductive risk attempts to show that practical and ethical costs of errors should influence standards of evidence for accepting scientific claims. A common objection charges that this argument presupposes a behavioral theory of acceptance that is inappropriate for science. I respond by showing that the argument from inductive risk is supported by a nonbehavioral theory of acceptance developed by Cohen, which defines acceptance in terms of premising. Moreover, I argue that theories designed to explain how acceptance can be guided exclusively by epistemic values suffer from difficulties that do not afflict Cohen’s theory
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/673936
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,178
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?Isaac Levi - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.
A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):305-330.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
Values, Standpoints, and Scientific/Intellectual Movements.Kristina Rolin - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:11-19.
Science, Truth and Dictatorship: Wishful Thinking or Wishful Speaking?Stephen John - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 78:64-72.
Acceptance, Values, and Probability.Daniel Steel - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:81-88.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
Inductive Risk and Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
Moral Autonomy and the Rationality of Science.James C. Gaa - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):513-541.
The Objects of Acceptance: Competing Scientific Explanations.Ronald C. Hopson - 1972 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:349 - 363.
Who Needs Inductive Acceptance Rules?Wesley C. Salmon - 1968 - In Imre Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North Holland Pub. Co.. pp. 139--144.
A Material Theory of Induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
Underdetermination and the Explanation of Theory-Acceptance: A Response to Samir Okasha.Ward E. Jones - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):299 – 304.


Added to PP index

Total views
81 ( #134,316 of 2,454,921 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #225,801 of 2,454,921 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes