Belief control and intentionality

Synthese 188 (2):145-163 (2012)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional
Keywords Belief  Compatibilism  Deciding to believe  Doxastic attitudes  Doxastic voluntarism  Intentionality  Libertarianism  Volitions  Voluntary control
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9919-3
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,188
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
Deontology and Descartes's Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.
The Illusion of Discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Belief and Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - 1987 - Topoi 6 (September):121-131.
Acceptance and Deciding to Believe.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
Deriving Intentionality From Artifacts.J. Scott Jordan - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):412-412.
Culpable Control or Moral Concepts?Mark Alicke & David Rose - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):330-331.
Intentionality.Daniel C. Dennett - 2001 - In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 139-143.
Developing the Idea of Intentionality: Children's Theories of Mind.Alison Gopnik - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):89-114.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-10-03

Total downloads

80 ( #63,628 of 2,154,091 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

19 ( #21,569 of 2,154,091 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums