Synthese 188 (2):145-163 (2012)

Authors
Matthias Steup
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional
Keywords Belief  Compatibilism  Deciding to believe  Doxastic attitudes  Doxastic voluntarism  Intentionality  Libertarianism  Volitions  Voluntary control
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9919-3
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References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Intentionality.J. R. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.

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Citations of this work BETA

Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.
In Defense of Doxastic Blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.
Believing Intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 38 citations / Add more citations

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