Conglomerability, disintegrability and the comparative principle

Analysis 81 (3):479-488 (2021)
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Our aim here is to present a result that connects some approaches to justifying countable additivity. This result allows us to better understand the force of a recent argument for countable additivity due to Easwaran. We have two main points. First, Easwaran’s argument in favour of countable additivity should have little persuasive force on those permissive probabilists who have already made their peace with violations of conglomerability. As our result shows, Easwaran’s main premiss – the comparative principle – is strictly stronger than conglomerability. Second, with the connections between the comparative principle and other probabilistic concepts clearly in view, we point out that opponents of countable additivity can still make a case that countable additivity is an arbitrary stopping point between finite and full additivity.

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Author Profiles

Rush T. Stewart
King's College London
Michael Nielsen
University of Sydney

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1959 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin T. Kelly - 1996 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin Kelly - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):351-354.
Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis.Daniel Hoek - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):639-60.

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