Classical Logic and the Liar

Logic and Logical Philosophy:1 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The liar and kindred paradoxes show that we can derive contradictions when we reason in accordance with classical logic from the schema (T) about truth: S is true iff p, where ‘p’ is to be replaced with a sentence and ‘S’ with a name of that sentence. The paper presents two arguments to the effect that the blame lies not with (T) but with classical logic. The arguments derive contradictions using classical logic, but instead of appealing to (T), they invoke semantic claims that seem even harder to reject. The first argument relies on two standard semantic principles that are not disquotational and on the claim that if there is such a thing as the property of being true, then ‘true’ expresses that property. The second argument relies on a schema about meaning: S means that p, where ‘S’ and ‘p’ are to be replaced as before.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,102

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Liar-type Paradoxes and the Incompleteness Phenomena.Makoto Kikuchi & Taishi Kurahashi - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (4):381-398.
Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar.Greg Littmann - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):15-27.
Liar paradox.Bradley Dowden - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Propositional Theory of Truth.Yannis Stephanou - 2018 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (4):503-545.
Truth's saviour?Kevin Scharp - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):183-188.
The Liar Parody.Don S. Levi - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (243):43-62.
The Byzantine Liar.Stamatios Gerogiorgakis - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (4):313-330.
An illocutionary logical explanation of the liar paradox.John T. Kearns - 2007 - History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):31-66.
Can u do that?J. Beall, G. Priest & Z. Weber - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):280-285.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-05

Downloads
32 (#445,919)

6 months
7 (#213,770)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references