First person epistemology

Philosophy 74 (4):475-497 (1999)
I argue that the distinction between first-person present and other-directed contexts of justification throws new light on epistemology. In particular, it has implications for the relations between justification, knowledge and truth, the debate between externalism and internalism, and the prospects for reflective equilibrium. I suggest that to focus on the third-person questions about knowledge or justification is to risk missing the main point of epistemology, namely to help us make reflective judgments about what to believe.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819199000637
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,173
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Opinion, Belief or Faith, and Knowledge.Leslie Stevenson - 2003 - Kantian Review 7 (1):72-101.
Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism.Alexander S. Harper - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
Six Levels of Mentality.Leslie F. Stevenson - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):105-124.
Locke and Leibniz on Religious Faith.Michael Losonsky - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (4):703 - 721.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

37 ( #135,692 of 2,152,487 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #225,918 of 2,152,487 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums