First person epistemology

Philosophy 74 (4):475-497 (1999)
I argue that the distinction between first-person present and other-directed contexts of justification throws new light on epistemology. In particular, it has implications for the relations between justification, knowledge and truth, the debate between externalism and internalism, and the prospects for reflective equilibrium. I suggest that to focus on the third-person questions about knowledge or justification is to risk missing the main point of epistemology, namely to help us make reflective judgments about what to believe
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819199000637
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Leslie F. Stevenson (2002). Six Levels of Mentality. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):105-124.
Michael Losonsky (2012). Locke and Leibniz on Religious Faith. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (4):703 - 721.

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