Peter Stemmer
Universität Konstanz
The aim of this article is to explicate and to defend a desire-based conception of practical reasons. Often such a conception is suspected of reducing reasons to a mere motivational function and to spirit the central normative role away. It is, I think, totally correct that the primary function of reasons is to speak in favour of an action and to make an action right. But an analysis of this normative side shows that the speaking-in-favour-of itself presupposes a desire-relationship.
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DOI 10.3196/004433020828856863
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