David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33 (2011)
In this paper I propose a teleological account of epistemic reasons. In recent years, the main challenge for any such account has been to explicate a sense in which epistemic reasons depend on the value of epistemic properties. I argue that while epistemic reasons do not directly depend on the value of epistemic properties, they depend on a different class of reasons which are value based in a direct sense, namely reasons to form beliefs about certain propositions or subject matters. In short, S has an epistemic reason to believe that p if and only if S is such that if S has reason to form a belief about p, then S ought to believe that p. I then propose a teleological explanation of this relationship. It is also shown how the proposal can avoid various subsidiary objections commonly thought to riddle the teleological account.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Steven L. Reynolds (2011). Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations. Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.
L. S. Carrier (2011). The Essential Tie Between Knowing and Believing: A Causal Account of Knowledge and Epistemic Reasons. Edwin Mellen Press.
Robert Audi (1983). Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and Defeasibility. Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139.
Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Hamid Vahid (2010). Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons. Synthese 176 (3):447-462.
Anthony Robert Booth (2014). Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). An Alternative Account of Epistemic Reasons for Action: In Response to Booth. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):191-198.
Joshua Gert (2008). Putting Particularism in its Place. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). Expressivism and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse. In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.
Anthony Robert Booth (2006). Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action? Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
Added to index2009-03-20
Total downloads272 ( #10,490 of 1,925,534 )
Recent downloads (6 months)52 ( #6,682 of 1,925,534 )
How can I increase my downloads?