In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-123 (2017)

Authors
Andrew Stephenson
University of Southampton
Abstract
In this paper I return to the question of whether intuition is object-dependent. Kant’s account of the imagination appears to suggest that intuition is not object-dependent. On a recent proposal, however, the imagination is a faculty of merely inner intuition, the inner objects of which exist and are present in the way demanded by object-dependence views, such as Lucy Allais’s relational account. I argue against this proposal on both textual and philosophical grounds. It is inconsistent with what Kant says about how the imagination functions and is ultimately incompatible with the relational account it is supposed to support. Kant’s account of the imagination remains a serious obstacle for the view that intuition is object-dependent.
Keywords Kant  Imagination  Intuition  Relationalism  Representationalism  Memory  Inner  Hallucination  Consciousness  Object-Dependence
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References found in this work BETA

The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Kant's Modal Metaphysics.Nicholas F. Stang - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A System of Rational Faculties: Additive or Transformative?Karl Schafer - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.

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