Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):486-508 (2015)

Authors
Andrew Stephenson
University of Southampton
Abstract
Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a niıve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant’s account of hallucination and argue that no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naive realist sense. Kant’s theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes and is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature.
Keywords Kant  Object-Dependence  Naive Realism  Hallucination  Phenomenal Character  Intuition  Experience  Perception  Conceptualism  Non-Conceptualism
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqu100
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.

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Citations of this work BETA

Kant's Modal Metaphysics.Nicholas F. Stang - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):529-578.
Kant's Account of Cognition.Eric Watkins & Marcus Willaschek - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (1):83-112.
A System of Rational Faculties: Additive or Transformative?Karl Schafer - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

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