Leibniz, creation and the best of all possible worlds

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 62 (3):123 - 133 (2007)
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Abstract

Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a situation. I conclude that either this is the best possible world or God is not our creator.

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Jesse Steinberg
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Leibniz’s and Herder’s philosophy of optimism.Vasil Gluchman - 2021 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 11 (1-2):37-47.
Drive for the divine.Darryl Wooldridge - 2015 - HTS Theological Studies 71 (3).

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References found in this work

Lectures on philosophical theology.Immanuel Kant - 1978 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Edited by Allen W. Wood & Gertrude M. Clark.
Why Only the Best Is Good Enough.Stephen Grover - 1988 - Analysis 48 (4):224 -.
The Freedom of God.Edward Wierenga - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):425-436.

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