Moral nativism: A sceptical response

Mind and Language 25 (3):279-297 (2010)
In the last few years, nativist, modular views of moral cognition have been influential. This paper shares the view that normative cognition develops robustly, and is probably an adaptation. But it develops an alternative view of the developmental basis of moral cognition, based on the idea that adults scaffold moral development by organising the learning environment of the next generation. In addition, I argue that the modular nativist picture has no plausible account of the role of explicit moral judgement, and that no persuasive version of the ‘poverty of the stimulus' applies to moral cognition
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01390.x
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Kim Sterelny & Ben Fraser (forthcoming). Evolution and Moral Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv060.

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