Mises, the A Priori, and the Foundations of Economics: A Qualified Defence

Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):175-196 (1997)
In a recent paper, Pierluigi Barrotta argues that Mises ‘ended up by defending an epistemological tenet very far from Kant's’ , concluding that ‘Mises's apriorism cannot be vindicated through Kant's epistemology’ . In contrast, I shall argue that certain of Mises's arguments can be reconstructed in Kantian terms, and thus the distance between Mises and Kant is not as extreme as Barrotta's argument may appear to suggest. Specifically, I shall argue that Mises, like Kant, seeks to establish the a priori nature of the category of causality. To this extent at least, Mises's apriorism can be vindicated through Kant's epistemology.
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267100004478
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References found in this work BETA
Immanuel Kant (1991). Critique of Pure Reason. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
P. F. Strawson (1967). The Bounds of Sense. Philosophy 42 (162):379-382.
Immanuel Kant (1993). Opus Postumum. Cambridge University Press.

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