Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):162–177 (2020)

Authors
Erik Stei
Utrecht University
Abstract
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to φ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2. If you accept all sentences in Γ, then, by normativity, you make a mistake if you reject φ. In order to avoid mistakes, you should accept φ or suspend judgment about φ. Both options are problematic for pluralism. Can pluralists avoid this worry by rejecting the normativity of logic? I argue that they cannot. All else being equal, the argument goes through even if logic is not normative.
Keywords Logical Pluralism  Normativity Objection  Collapse Problem  Normativity
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Reprint years 2020
DOI 10.1093/pq/pqz040
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Logic.Stewart Shapiro - 2014 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Normative Autonomy of Logic.Diego Tajer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.
Disagreement About Logic From a Pluralist Perspective.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3329-3350.
Logic as a Methodological Discipline.Gil Sagi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9725-9749.

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