Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection

Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):162–177 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to φ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2. If you accept all sentences in Γ, then, by normativity, you make a mistake if you reject φ. In order to avoid mistakes, you should accept φ or suspend judgment about φ. Both options are problematic for pluralism. Can pluralists avoid this worry by rejecting the normativity of logic? I argue that they cannot. All else being equal, the argument goes through even if logic is not normative.

Similar books and articles

Logical pluralism and normativity.Teresa Kouri Kissel & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
The normative problem for logical pluralism.Nathan Kellen - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):258-281.
Normativity for Alethic-Logical Pluralists.Andy Demfree Yu - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-12

Downloads
476 (#22,346)

6 months
88 (#10,834)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Erik Stei
Utrecht University

Citations of this work

The Normative Autonomy of Logic.Diego Tajer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2661-2684.
Logic as a methodological discipline.Gil Sagi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9725-9749.
Disagreement about logic from a pluralist perspective.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3329-3350.
The collapse of logical contextualism.Timo Meier - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Logic.Stewart Shapiro - 2014 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
The truth Norm of belief.Conor Mchugh - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.

View all 18 references / Add more references