On universals: An extensionalist alternative to Quine's resemblance theory [Book Review]

Abstract
The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine’s theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine’s theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism and realism: Universals and Scientific realism (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). In the present paper, I propose an alternative framework that accounts for the phenomena that Quine intends to explain with his resemblance theory. The framework agrees with Quine’s austere ontology; in particular, it does not assume the existence of properties and of possible worlds. (I will mention below Quine’s reason for rejecting properties and possible worlds. For a theory of Universals that assumes possible worlds, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.) Moreover, the framework is extensionalist since the abstract entities it assumes are classes and these can be individuated extensionally, for classes are identical if their members are identical. Finally, I will refute some of the objections to Quine’s approach that have been raised by Armstrong and Oliver [(1996). The metaphysics of properties. Mind, 105, 1–80.] and I will argue that, contrary to what has been claimed by Oliver in a comment on Lewis [(1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.], Quine is able to specify an important set of sparse properties.
Keywords Universals  Similarity  Kinds  Sparse properties  Quine  Rodriquez-Pereyra
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Conjectures and Refutations.K. R. Popper - 1966 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.

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