Precedent

International Encyclopedia of Ethics (2021)
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Abstract

This entry discusses precedents. A precedent is created when a decision to φ is made under a certain set of circumstances such that, if a relevantly similar set of circumstances were to occur, there would be a prima facie duty to make the corresponding decision. The entry engages with two puzzles surrounding the normative force of precedents. First, it discusses two options for the basis of this normative force: (1) the possibility that it stems from a general principle that like cases must be treated alike and (2) the possibility that it must be based on additional reasons each time. Second, it discusses two options for the determination of a specific precedent's scope: (1) that precedents establish rules so that all those cases that fall under the rule are governed by the precedent, or (2) that precedents are applied via analogical comparison, so that all relevantly similar cases are governed by the precedent.

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