Abstract
Nietzsche’s metaethics is a topic which, especially in the last decade, has gained ever
increasing attention among Anglo-American Nietzsche-scholars. Conversely, this topic
has been almost ignored by continental philosophers. This paper aims to give a general
overview of the ongoing discussion, focusing on several problems originating from the
attempt to give a coherent and non-contradictory picture of both Nietzsche’s negative
and positive metaethical position. Attention will be first directed to Nietzsche’s moral
perspectivism (1) and then to his alleged proto-error theory (2). Subsequently, the focus
will be on Nietzsche’s moral projectivism and the question of whether this position
necessarily requires a non-cognitivist view of moral discourse (3). Finally, the last section
will be devoted to a discussion of how to reconcile Nietzsche’s negative metaethics
with his positive metaethics (4).