Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science
Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):425-437 (2011)
Abstract
Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel’s (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive scienceAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01143.x
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Citations of this work
The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective.Jelle Bruineberg, Julian Kiverstein & Erik Rietveld - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6).
Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and Non-causal.M. Chirimuuta - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):849-880.
Dynamical Models and Explanation in Neuroscience.Lauren N. Ross - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (1):32-54.
Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences.Michael Silberstein & Anthony Chemero - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):958-970.
One mechanism, many models: a distributed theory of mechanistic explanation.Eric Hochstein - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1387-1407.
References found in this work
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition.James J. Gibson - 1979 - Houghton Mifflin.
Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
