“Population” Is Not a Natural Kind of Kinds
Biological Theory 5 (2):154-160 (2010)
Abstract
Millstein (2009) argues against conceptual pluralism with respect to the definition of “population,” and proposes her own definition of the term. I challenge both Millstein's negative arguments against conceptual pluralism and her positive proposal for a singular definition of population. The concept of population, I argue, does not refer to a natural kind; populations are constructs of biologists variably defined by contexts of inquiry.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1162/biot_a_00029
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Citations of this work
The mind, the lab, and the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Ryan Giordano, Michael D. Edge & Rasmus Nielsen - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 52:12-21.
Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary Groups.Matthew J. Barker & Joel D. Velasco - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):971-982.
Searching for Darwinism in Generalized Darwinism.Thomas A. C. Reydon & Markus Scholz - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):561-589.
Prediction in selectionist evolutionary theory.Rasmus Gr⊘Nfeldt Winther - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):889-901.
Do We Need a New Account of Group Selection? A Reply to McLoone.Ciprian Jeler - 2016 - Biological Theory 11 (2):57-68.
References found in this work
Two ways of thinking about fitness and natural selection.Mohan Matthen & André Ariew - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):55-83.
The trials of life: Natural selection and random drift.Denis M. Walsh, Andre Ariew & Tim Lewens - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (3):452-473.
Natural selection as a population-level causal process.Roberta L. Millstein - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):627-653.