Pleonastic propositions and the face value theory

Synthese:1-16 (forthcoming)

Authors
Abstract
Propositions are a useful tool in philosophical theorizing, even though they are not beyond reasonable nominalistic doubts. Stephen Schiffer’s pleonasticism about propositions is a paradigm example of a realistic account that tries to alleviate such doubts by grounding truths about propositions in ontologically innocent facts. Schiffer maintains two characteristic theses about propositions: first, that they are so-called pleonastic entities whose existence is subject to what he calls something-from-nothing transformations ; and, second, that they are the referents of ‘that’-clauses that function as singular terms in propositional attitude ascriptions. The paper turns the first thesis against the second: if propositions are pleonastic entities, it is argued, we should not take them to be referred to in propositional attitude ascriptions. Rather, propositional attitude ascriptions should be available as bases for propositional something-from-nothing transformations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1742-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,999
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On What Grounds What.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
Getting Priority Straight.Louis deRosset - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73-97.
Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?Kent Bach - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):218-224.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Pleonastic Propositions.Stephen Schiffer - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court. pp. 353--81.
Schiffer’s New Theory of Propositions. [REVIEW]Thomas Hofweber - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):211–217.
Pleonastic Possible Worlds.Alexander Steinberg - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):767-789.
Pleonastic Fregeanism.Stephen Schiffer - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:1-15.
Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.
On Product‐Based Accounts of Propositional Attitudes.Giulia Felappi - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):302-313.
Are Propositions Mere Measures Of Mind?Gurpreet Rattan - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3).

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-05-16

Total views
11 ( #688,930 of 2,266,718 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #349,346 of 2,266,718 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature