Philosophical Psychopathology and Self‐Consciousness

In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 484–499 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter is about susceptibility to one type of division within our selves that can occur within self‐conscious experience and is present in certain mental disorders. This is the separation between experiencing oneself as subject and as agent. The chapter considers some disorders of self‐consciousness and examines the role that this particular division may play in those disorders. Companion to consciousness studies is not completed without attention to the philosophical psychopathology of self‐consciousness. The chapter also examines the case of verbal auditory hallucinations. Investigators often say that hallucinations involve “loss of ego boundaries” or “internal/external confusion”. The chapter presents a case of alienated self‐consciousness, and explores the phenomenon of thought insertion. According to the standard or traditional account of thought insertion, the patient is aware of her own thoughts, but denies that they are hers and attributes them to someone else. So, thought insertion certainly seems to constitute alienated awareness of one's own thoughts.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,960

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Philosophical psychopathology and self-consciousness.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 194--208.
Review of When self-consciousness breaks: Alien voices and inserted thoughts. [REVIEW]No Authorship Indicated - 2001 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):180-180.
Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - In Pascual Angel Gargiulo & Humbert Mesones-Arroyo (eds.), Psychiatry and Neurosciences Update: Vol 4. Springer. pp. 61-71.
Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
Thought insertion and the inseparability thesis.Paul J. Gibbs - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
14 (#1,294,570)

6 months
4 (#1,291,232)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gary Stephens
Middlesex University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references