Peirce, Pedigree, Probability

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (2):138-166 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


An aspect of Peirce’s thought that may still be underappreciated is his resistance to what Levi calls _pedigree epistemology_, to the idea that a central focus in epistemology should be the justification of current beliefs. Somewhat more widely appreciated is his rejection of the subjective view of probability. We argue that Peirce’s criticisms of subjectivism, to the extent they grant such a conception of probability is viable at all, revert back to pedigree epistemology. A thoroughgoing rejection of pedigree in the context of probabilistic epistemology, however, _does_ challenge prominent subjectivist responses to the problem of the priors.



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Genuine belief and genuine doubt in Peirce.Jeff Kasser - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):840-853.
Bayesian probability.Patrick Maher - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127.
A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs.Cesaltina Pacheco Pires - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152.
Probability, Objectivity, and Induction.Arnold Baise - 2013 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 13 (2):81-95.
Uncommon priors require origin disputes.Robin Hanson - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (4):319-328.
Bayesian model learning based on predictive entropy.Jukka Corander & Pekka Marttinen - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):5-20.
Imprecise probability in epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitat
Bayesianism and reliable scientific inquiry.Cory Juhl - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):302-319.


Added to PP

448 (#37,800)

6 months
226 (#8,523)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Tom F. Sterkenburg
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Rush T. Stewart
King's College London

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations