This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine. Kurt Gödel thought that the intensional paradoxes stand in the way of proving that the mind is not a machine. According to Gödel, a successful proof that the mind is not a machine would require a solution to the intensional paradoxes. We provide what might seem to be a partial vindication of Gödel and show that if a particular solution to the intensional paradoxes is adopted, one can indeed give an argument to the effect that the mind is not a machine.
Keywords Gödel's disjunction  Gödelian arguments against mechanism  incompleteness theorems  intensional paradox  mechanism  theories of truth
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.271
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References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Minds, Machines and Gödel.John R. Lucas - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):112-127.
Minds, Machines and Gödel.J. R. Lucas - 1961 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
Reflecting on Incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.

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On a Purported Proof That the Mind Is Not a Machine.Peter Koellner - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):91-96.

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