Authors
Stephen Grimm
Fordham University
Abstract
I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who understands. Against several contemporary epistemologists, I argue that it is not transparent in the way that many have claimed, drawing on results from developmental psychology, animal cognition, and other fields.
Keywords understanding  epistemology  psychology  animal cognition
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References found in this work BETA

The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Explicating Objectual Understanding: Taking Degrees Seriously.Christoph Baumberger - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 1:1-22.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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