Synthese 99 (2):137-72 (1994)

Abstract
  Cohen (1981) and others have made an interesting argument for the thesis that humans are rational: normative principles of reasoning and actual human reasoning ability cannot diverge because both are determined by the same process involving our intuitions about what constitutes good reasoning as a starting point. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this argument sees reflective equilibrium as the process that determines both what the norms of reasoning are and what actual cognitive competence is. In this essay, I will evaluate both the general argument that humans are rational and the reflective equilibrium argument for the same thesis. While I find both accounts initially appealing, I will argue that neither successfully establishes that humans are rational
Keywords Epistemology  Equilibrium  Knowledge  Linguistics  Rationality
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Should Reason Be Fragmented?Nenad Miščević - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (1):23-36.
A Reply to Stein.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):173 - 176.

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