Reasoning by Precedent—Between Rules and Analogies

Legal Theory 24 (3):216-254 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper investigates the process of reasoning through which a judge determines whether a precedent-case gives her a binding reason to follow in her present-case. I review the objections that have been raised against the two main accounts of reasoning by precedent: the rule-account and the analogy-account. I argue that both accounts can be made viable by amending them to meet the objections. Nonetheless, I believe that there is an argument for preferring accounts that integrate analogical reasoning: any account of reasoning by precedent that is descriptively minimally adequate will leave some room for judicial discretion. Discretion should be used under consideration of the best legally relevant arguments for and against a decision. Integrating analogical reasoning helps the judge to bring to her own attention the strongest case for following. Analogical reasoning also eases the recognition of possible reasons for distinguishing. Thereby, it facilitates a more balanced decision-making process.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,141

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Precedent and Legal Analogy.Kevin D. Ashley - 2011 - In Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag. pp. 673-710.
Analogical Reasoning.Jefferson White - 1996 - In Dennis M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell. pp. 571–577.
Common-law judicial reasoning and analogy.Adam Rigoni - 2014 - Legal Theory 20 (2):133-156.
The Logic of Analogy.Avi Sion - 2023 - USA: Amazon/Kindle.
Analogical Reasoning in Ethics.Georg Spielthenner - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):861-874.
Legal Practices and the Reason of the Law.Kurt Nutting - 2002 - Argumentation 16 (1):111-133.
Do precedents create rules?Grant Lamond - 2005 - Legal Theory 11 (1):1-26.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-10-06

Downloads
98 (#217,983)

6 months
18 (#170,392)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Katharina Stevens
University of Lethbridge

Citations of this work

Max Weber and Social Ontology.Joshua Rust - 2021 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51 (3):312-342.
Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered.Norbert Paulo - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):107-123.
Case-to-Case Arguments.Katharina Stevens - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (3):431-455.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Authority, Law and Morality.Joseph Raz - 1985 - The Monist 68 (3):295-324.
Argument by Analogy.André Juthe - 2005 - Argumentation 19 (1):1-27.
A factor-based definition of precedential constraint.John F. Horty & Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon - 2012 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (2):181-214.

View all 15 references / Add more references