Authors
Erik Stei
Utrecht University
Abstract
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This very general characterization gives rise to a whole family of positions. I argue that not all of them are stable. The main argument in the paper is inspired by considerations known as the “collapse problem”, and it aims at the most popular form of logical pluralism advocated by JC Beall and Greg Restall. I argue that there is a more general argument available that challenges all variants of logical pluralism that meet the following three conditions: that there are at least two correct logical systems characterized in terms of different consequence relations, that there is some sort of rivalry among the correct logics, and that logical consequence is normative. The hypothesis I argue for amounts to conditional claim: If a position satisfies all these conditions, then that position is unstable in the sense that it collapses into competing positions.
Keywords Logical pluralism  Collapse problem  Normativity  Logical consequence
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Reprint years 2020
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DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2017.1327370
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophy of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Logic.Stewart Shapiro - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Logical Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Normativity of Logic.Sebastiano Moruzzi & Filippo Ferrari - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):323-346.
Logical Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Normativity of Logic.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.

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