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Self-consciousness, mental agency, and the clinical psychopathology of thought insertion
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (1):1-10 (1994)
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The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 74 (C):102770.
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