Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism: Answering the Question of Justification

Oxford University Press (2000)
Robert Stern investigates how scepticism can be countered by using transcendental arguments concerning the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, language, or thought. He shows that the most damaging sceptical questions concern neither the certainty of our beliefs nor the reliability of our belief-forming methods, but rather how we can justify our beliefs.
Keywords Skepticism  Transcendental logic  Justification (Theory of knowledge
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Reprint years 2004
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Call number BD201.S73 2000
ISBN(s) 0198250533   9780198250531     9780199261574
DOI 10.1093/mind/110.439.858
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Kant and Nonconceptual Content.Robert Hanna - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):247-290.
What Were Kant's Aims in the Deduction?Gary Hatfield - 2003 - Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2):165-198.
The Nature of Transcendental Arguments.Mark Sacks - 2005 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4):439 – 460.

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