Toward a theory of event identity

Philosophy of Science 41 (1):65-83 (1974)
Abstract
This paper takes the first steps in the construction of a theory of event identity as that theory applies to historical sentences. The theory is extensional throughout. Following statements of criteria of adequacy for the construction, Davidson's method of regimenting sentences is adopted in order to allow for variables ranging over events. Events in this theory are only partially construed, that is, to the extent of treating them as concrete individuals rather than as classes or repeatable universals. The paper concludes with a statement of several theorems and definitions and an example of how the theory works
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DOI 10.1086/288570
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Adequacy Conditions and Event Identity.Michael Bradie - 1981 - Synthese 49 (3):337 - 374.

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