Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):609-623 (2009)

Despite its appeal and popularity, the view that membership in a natural kind is essential to an individual is unsupported by the logic of essences and has no compelling reflective support. While the view has strong intuitive and empirical support this is insufficient to establish it. There are advantages to abandoning the view that kind membership is essential to individuals. One of these advantages is that it allows for a reconfiguring of the problem of material constitution in a way that removes much of the paradox
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802340634
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

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Boring Ontological Realism.Meghan Sullivan - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (3):399-413.

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