The No Guidance Argument

Theoria 79 (1):279-283 (2013)
Abstract
In a recent article, I criticized Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss's so-called “no guidance argument” against the truth norm for belief, for conflating the conditions under which that norm recommends belief with the psychological state one must be in to apply the norm. In response, Glüer and Wikforss have offered a new formulation of the no guidance argument, which makes it apparent that no such conflation is made. However, their new formulation of the argument presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour, and betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm. Once this is taken into account, it becomes clear that the no guidance argument fails
Keywords truth norm  belief
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12001
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References found in this work BETA
Weighing the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.
No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
How Norms Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.

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