The no-free-lunch theorems of supervised learning

Synthese 199 (3-4):9979-10015 (2021)
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Abstract

The no-free-lunch theorems promote a skeptical conclusion that all possible machine learning algorithms equally lack justification. But how could this leave room for a learning theory, that shows that some algorithms are better than others? Drawing parallels to the philosophy of induction, we point out that the no-free-lunch results presuppose a conception of learning algorithms as purely data-driven. On this conception, every algorithm must have an inherent inductive bias, that wants justification. We argue that many standard learning algorithms should rather be understood as model-dependent: in each application they also require for input a model, representing a bias. Generic algorithms themselves, they can be given a model-relative justification.

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Tom F. Sterkenburg
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

ML interpretability: Simple isn't easy.Tim Räz - 2024 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 103 (C):159-167.
On the Philosophy of Unsupervised Learning.David S. Watson - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (2):1-26.
The problem of induction.John Vickers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peirce, Pedigree, Probability.Rush T. Stewart & Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2022 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (2):138-166.

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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