Abstract

Since 1949, the year that Kurt Gödel presented his solutions to Einstein’s field equations, there has been much discussion of time travel within the philosophical literature. Whereas theorizing about time travel had theretofore been relegated to the realm of science fiction, the imprimatur of Gödel’s work elevated the legitimacy of such discussion. It finally appeared that travel into the past might be a physical—if not yet technological—possibility. For the past few decades, philosophical inquiry into backward time travel and the closely related topic of backward causation has centered on the logical possibility and conceptual coherence of these phenomena. In this paper, various conceptual problems associated with time travel concerning the nature of agency and nomological structure will be explored. However, the existence of such conceptual difficulties does not threaten the logical or physical possibility of time travel. Ultimately, the most rational stance to take regarding time travel may ultimately be one of epistemic humility, by which is meant a stance involving the admission that conceptual analysis may not constitute a very fruitful methodology for understanding the physical nature of our world.