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When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts
MIT Press (2000)
Abstract
An examination of verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of "alienated self-consciousness."Author Profiles
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Review of When self-consciousness breaks: Alien voices and inserted thoughts. [REVIEW]No Authorship Indicated - 2001 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):180-180.
When Self-consciousness breaks: Alien voices and inserted thoughts by G. Lynn Stephens George Graham.Peter Zachar - 2002 - Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):273-280.
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When self-consciousness breaks: Alien voices and inserted thoughts.Christian Perring - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):623-626.
When Self-Consciousness Breaks - Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham. [REVIEW]Helena de Preester - 2000 - Philosophica 66 (2).
Philosophical Psychopathology and Self‐Consciousness.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 484–499.
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A critical review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's when self-consciousness breaks. [REVIEW]Joëlle Proust - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):543 – 550.
Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - In Pascual Angel Gargiulo & Humbert Mesones-Arroyo (eds.), Psychiatry and Neurosciences Update: Vol 4. Springer. pp. 61-71.
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Citations of this work
Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):523-539.
Beyond the comparator model: A multi-factorial two-step account of agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:931.
On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.
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