Wittgenstein's Transcendental Deduction and Kant's Private Language Argument

Kant-Studien 73 (1-4):321-337 (1982)
I first criticize strawson's account of the transcendental deduction, And then argue that wittgenstein's considerations (in his later work) of the rule-Governed nature of judgment can be used to reconstruct a valid argument for a certain kind of objectivity, Which excludes solipsims. I suggest how kant's talk of synthesis can be reinterpreted in the light of this, As indeed can the doctrine of empirical realism and transcendental idealism
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DOI 10.1515/kant.1982.73.1-4.321
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David Bain (2004). Private Languages and Private Theorists. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):427 - 434.

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