Synthese 64 (1):115-35 (1985)
1. When we attribute beliefs, desires, and other states of common sense psychology to a person, or for that matter to an animal or an artifact, we are assuming or presupposing that the person or object can be treated as an intentional system. 2. An intentional system is one which is rational through and through; its beliefs are those it ought to have, given its perceptual capacities, its epistemic needs, and its biography…. Its desires are those it ought to have, given its biological needs and the most practicable means of satisfying them…. And its behavior will consist of those acts that it would be rational for an agent with those beliefs and desires to perform. [beliefs + desires action] 3. If rationality is absent, we cannot coherently ascribe beliefs at all. 4. Therefore, no experiment could demonstrate that people systematically invoke invalid or irrational inferential strategies.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - MIT Press.
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross - 1980 - Prentice-Hall.
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
Normative Theories of Argumentation: Are Some Norms Better Than Others?Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.
Similar books and articles
Intentionality Without Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):369 - 376.
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.R. Mele Alfred - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Can We Interpret Irrational Behavior?Lisa Bortolotti - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):359 - 375.
Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality.Edward Harcourt - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):111–129.
Intentional Systems Theory.Daniel Dennett - 2011 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Intentionality Without Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.
Maximization, Stability of Decision, and Actions in Accordance with Reason.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):60-77.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads133 ( #34,581 of 2,152,482 )
Recent downloads (6 months)18 ( #22,274 of 2,152,482 )
How can I increase my downloads?