Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel1

Intuitions play an important role in contemporary epistemology. Over the last decade, however, experimental philosophers have published a number of studies suggesting that epistemic intuitions may vary in ways that challenge the widespread reliance on intuitions in epistemology. In a recent paper, Jennifer Nagel offers a pair of arguments aimed at showing that epistemic intuitions do not, in fact, vary in problematic ways. One of these arguments relies on a number of claims defended by appeal to the psychological literature on intuitive judgment and on mental state attribution (also known as “theory of mind”, “mindreading” and “folk psychology”). I call this the "theoretical argument". The other argument relies on recent experimental work carried out by Nagel and her collaborators. It is my contention that in setting out her theoretical argument, Nagel offers an account of the relevant scientific literature that is, in crucial respects, flawed and misleading. My main goal in this paper is to rectify these errors and to make it clear that, once this is done, Nagel’s theoretical argument collapses. Since Nagel’s experimental work has not yet been published, and available details are very sketchy, I do not discuss this work in detail. However, in the final section of the paper I offer some critical observations about Nagel’s strategy for dealing with empirical data that does not support her view – both other people’s and her own.
Keywords experimental philosophy  epistemology  mindreading  theory of mind  cultural variation  Gettier cases  Nagel  intuition  perceptual illusion
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00590.x
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Jennifer Nagel (2012). Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
Jennifer Nagel (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.
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Carol Mason Spicer (1996). Introduction. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 (4):ix-x.
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