Deconstructing the mind

In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. pp. 479-482 (1996)
Abstract
Over the last two decades, debates over the viability of commonsense psychology have been center stage in both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Eliminativists have argued that advances in cognitive science and neuroscience will ultimately justify a rejection of our "folk" theory of the mind, and of its ontology. In the first half of this book Stich, who was at one time a leading advocate of eliminativism, maintains that even if the sciences develop in the ways that eliminativists foresee, none of the arguments for ontological elimination are tenable. Rather than being resolved by science, he contends, these ontological disputes will be settled by a pragmatic process in which social and political considerations have a major role to play. In later chapters, Stich argues that the widespread worry about "naturalizing" psychological properties is deeply confused, since there is no plausible account of what naturalizing requires on which the failure of the naturalization project would lead to eliminativism. He also offers a detailed analysis of the many different notions of folk psychology to be found in philosophy and psychology, and argues that simulation theory, which purports to be an alternative to folk psychology, is not supported by recent experimental findings
Keywords Deconstruction  Folk Psychology  Mental  Metaphysics  Mind  Naturalism  Pluralism  Positivism  Garon, J  Ramsey, W
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Call number BD418.3.S75 1996
ISBN(s) 0195100816  
DOI 10.2307/2653499
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Against Arguments From Reference.Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):332 - 356.
The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
Experimental Semantics.Michael Devitt - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):418 - 435.
If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):618-635.
Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism?Michael Devitt - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):285-293.

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Similar books and articles
Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 499-533.
Folk Psychology as a Theory.Ian Ravenscroft - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Connectionism Isn't Magic.Hugh Clapin - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (2):167-84.
Folk Psychology.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 1994 - Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science:235--255.
Folk Psychology.Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 35-71.

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