Empirical challenges to the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy, or why we are not “judgment skeptics”

Abstract

Bealer, G. (1998). “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy,” in M. DePaul & W. Ramsey, eds., Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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Stephen Stich
Rutgers - New Brunswick
Jonathan Weinberg
University of Arizona

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