Naturalizing epistemology: Quine, Simon and the prospects for pragmatism

In C. Hookway & D. Peterson (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-17 (1993)
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Abstract

In recent years there has been a great deal of discussion about the prospects of developing a “naturalized epistemology,” though different authors tend to interpret this label in quite different ways.1 One goal of this paper is to sketch three projects that might lay claim to the “naturalized epistemology” label, and to argue that they are not all equally attractive. Indeed, I’ll maintain that the first of the three – the one I’ll attribute to Quine – is simply incoherent. There is no way we could get what we want from an epistemological theory by pursuing the project Quine proposes. The second project on my list is a naturalized version of reliabilism. This project is not fatally flawed in the way that Quine’s is. However, it’s my contention that the sort of theory this project would yield is much less interesting than might at first be thought.

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Author's Profile

Stephen Stich
Rutgers - New Brunswick

References found in this work

Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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