Some problems for proof-theoretic semantics

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):278–298 (2008)
Abstract
Proof-theoretic semantics is an approach to logical semantics based on two ideas, of which the first is that the meaning of a logical connective can be explained by stipulating that some mode of inference, e.g., a natural deduction introduction or elimination rule, is permissible. The second idea is that the soundness of rules which are not stipulated outright may be deduced by some proof-theoretic argument from properties of the rules which are stipulated outright. I examine the first idea. My main conclusion is that the idea is more problematic, and requires more discussion, than has been generally realized. I mention five problems which will have to be overcome before the idea can be accepted as definitely viable.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.506.x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowing and Asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.
Meaning Approached Via Proofs.Dag Prawitz - 2006 - Synthese 148 (3):507-524.
Harmony and Autonomy in Classical Logic.Stephen Read - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):123-154.

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