In Alex Byrne & J. Thomson (eds.), Content and Modalities: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press. pp. 1 (2006)

Authors
Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
Abstract
Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by the intersection of three topics: physicalism, the conceivability argument, and the necessary a posteriori. I will be concerned here to describe the consensus view of these topics; to explain why I think this account is mistaken; and to briefly sketch an alternative.
Keywords Conceivability  Mind  Physicalism  Stalnaker, Robert
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References found in this work BETA

Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Kathleen Okruhlik - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.

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